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A BATTALION STAFF PREPARED FOR WAR: THE KEY TO COMBINED  
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
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
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A Battalion Staff Prepared for War:  
The Key to Combined Arms Success on the Modern Tactical Battlefield

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by  
Major Walter Wojdakowski  
Infantry

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School of Advanced Military Studies  
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This monograph finds today's staffs unable to effectively meet the combined arms challenges of the modern battlefield. Faults in doctrine, organization and awareness provide too many barriers to effective staff training and performance. This shortcoming cannot be ignored.

This study concludes with several recommendations to improve battalion staffs. First, an adjustment in battalion staff organization needs consideration. Second, the requirement for doctrinal improvement becomes apparent. Third, this paper recognizes the need for increased emphasis on the critical nature of battalion staffs. All these recommendations for the future will enhance our battalion staff preparedness for the employment of combined arms on the modern battlefield. This will improve the outlook for winning future engagements.

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The Key to Combined Arms Success on the Modern Tactical Battlefield

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
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## ABSTRACT

A BATTALION STAFF PREPARED FOR WAR: THE KEY TO COMBINED ARMS SUCCESS ON THE MODERN TACTICAL BATTLEFIELD by MAJ Walter Woidakowski, USA. 48 pages.

Today's battlefield, much expanded and highly lethal, requires better staffs at lower levels than ever before. The ability of battalion commanders and staffs to combine arms effectively in order to gain an edge over the enemy in future engagements is essential. Their success or failure will have a major impact upon higher units and the Army altogether in the next war. Whether today's battalion staffs can meet the immense combined arms challenges likely to exist on the modern battlefield is the main issue of this monograph.

This issue is addressed in three ways. First, the evolution of staff doctrine at battalion level is explored. Then, the paper analyzes two historical examples from World War II to assess the effects of doctrine upon staff abilities to employ combined arms. Finally, using insights from history as a basis, the paper explores the abilities of today's staffs to effectively combine arms on the battlefield.

This monograph finds today's staffs unable to effectively meet the combined arms challenges of the modern battlefield. Faults in doctrine, organization, and awareness provide too many barriers to effective staff training and performance. This shortcoming cannot be ignored.

This study concludes with several recommendations to improve battalion staffs. First, an adjustment in battalion staff organization needs consideration. Second, the requirement for doctrinal improvement becomes apparent. Third, this paper recognizes the need for increased emphasis on the critical nature of battalion staffs. All these recommendations for the future will enhance our battalion staff preparedness for the employment of combined arms on the modern battlefield. This will improve the outlook for winning future engagements.



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## I. INTRODUCTION

The advent of National Training Center (NTC) rotations for maneuver battalion task forces six years ago began a period of intense evaluation of units in a simulated wartime environment. One focus of NTC training is on the ability of battalion-level staffs to perform their many functions. This focus is critical since battalion is the lowest level which has a staff to plan and execute actions of all combined arms. Literally hundreds of insights are published and thousands of critiques have occurred in an attempt to capture the staff lessons from NTC. (1)

Regardless of the reader's point of view about NTC realism, one must admit many expectations for staff performance are not being met at the Army's most realistic training center. In January 1988 the Army will conduct a "focused" rotation specifically designed to analyze what is wrong with lower level staffs. (2) Why are they unable to accomplish effectively those tasks specified in the doctrine which has developed over the past eighty years? I believe adequate experience already exists to draw some conclusions on this subject. My own experiences as a Battalion Executive Officer reinforce this idea. Training a peacetime staff to be proficient in wartime tasks is difficult. This concern certainly deserves analysis.

Failings at the National Training Center are not the only reasons for concern. In the past, U.S. Army units suffered in combat due, in part, to the failings of staffs. Although many times the American soldier fought to the best of his ability,

shortcomings in the preparation of staffs for the real world of combat often led to unacceptable results. (3) For whatever reasons, the abilities of military staffs were often substandard resulting in undue casualties and even unexpected defeat. A look at some of these failings helps to assess our ability to fight at the outset of combat. Staff shortcomings present within tactical units may have relevance to higher units. The impact of battalion engagements on the success of battles is obvious. Since staff performance may determine success at lower levels, the implications for success at all levels may be profound.

Another reason for concern is the linkage between battalion staffs and command and control. Today in the U.S. Army, no topic receives more emphasis than command and control. FC 101-55, Corps and Division Command and Control (1985), and FC 71-6, Battalion and Brigade Command and Control (1985), are testaments to the importance of this issue. The subject is also addressed in current military publications and journals. With the lethality of today's battlefield, the increased emphasis on time and space, and the availability of more complex systems at lower levels, today's commanders face ever-increasing challenges to command and control. (4) It is now of more concern to commanders than ever, including those at much lower levels than before.

The staff, an integral part of command and control, is more important to success at lower levels than ever before. In fact, the staff may be the critical element at this level. FM 100-5, Operations, recognizes staff importance. A commander's "command and control system must assure rapid execution of his order without

sacrificing momentum or coordination. This requires solid staff work and strongly developed skills of tactical anticipation." (5)  
"The command and control system must also stress standardized training in operations and staff practices to assure mutual understanding between leaders and units." (6)

Many senior leaders recognize the critical nature of staffs. General Carl E Vuono, Army Chief of Staff recognizes staff training as a top priority. He believes planning is the biggest deficiency in the Army. (7) This indicates the need for better staffs to meet the challenges of the modern battlefield. Lieutenant General Crosbie E. Saint, Commander, III Corps believes "the staff is an element of combat power" and "the staff is key to focusing combat power". (8) His concern about the special demands facing staffs today has led to increased emphasis upon staff training within his Corps. (9)

The recognition that lower-level commanders are severely challenged to command and control units is an important conclusion. A concern in meeting these challenges is embodied in the commander's staff. At the battalion level, where all arms must be combined for the first time, the staff plays a vital role. This paper will address one aspect of that role, the ability of the staff to assist the commander with using combat support arms. Can the battalion staff meet the combined arms challenges of modern warfare? Are staff members trained properly for the proper employment of combat support arms? This paper will attempt to answer these questions.

The methodology for this paper is straightforward and begins with a short discussion of staff evolution and U.S. staff doctrine. This discussion is important for three reasons. First, it establishes the crucial importance of the staff as an aid to command and control. Second, it highlights the U.S. doctrinal emphasis toward the functions of a staff. Finally, it outlines the genesis for staff organization. These aspects will be explored using two historical examples from World War II.

The 36th Division engagement at the Rapido River in January 1944 and the 28th Division's engagements vicinity of Schmidt in November 1944 are used. Both these examples show how divisions, regiments, and battalions in the past suffered from failings in the use of combat support arms. Current battalion staffs are apt to suffer from these same failings. The analysis of these two engagements will also show the impact the poor use of combat support arms has on the commander's ability to command and control. The lack of emphasis on staff preparedness to use combined arms during World War II will also come to light.

With these facts established, some insights into current battalion staffs are possible. Finally, some conclusions about staff wartime preparedness for using combat support arms will be drawn. These conclusions should lead to recommendations for improved training of battalion staffs for war.

Success on the next battlefield may hinge on the battalion staff's ability to assist with the accomplishment of the mission. An effective staff, forming the backbone of the unit's command and control system, will prove to be key to success on the modern

battlefield, just as it has in the past. A brief look at staff development throughout history supports this proposition and will form the basis for further analysis.

## II. HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF STAFFS

Staffs have been important to commanders throughout history. All "Great Captains" relied upon their staffs. Alexander had his Grammateus, the secretary who transmitted messages and maintained the diary, and his Bematists, surveyors who collected information on routes and camp sites. Scipio had secretaries, armor bearers, and aides. Gustavus Adolphus used wagon masters, a provision master, a judge advocate, and a paymaster. (10) These staffs accomplished routine duties and personal affairs. In those days, tactical planning and command of forces fell to the commander.

In the early 19th century staff planning took on a new meaning. With the expansion of the battlefield and the development of more lethal weapons, commanders could no longer personally command and control all operations. (11)

Napoleon first expanded staff duties. A Greek Army might occupy two square kilometers while a Napoleonic Army might cover 30 square kilometers and have a sphere of influence of hundreds of miles. Napoleon created the "French Imperial Headquarters" to assist in the control caused by this expanded battlefield. His headquarters consisted of the Maison, oriented toward cabinet duties, the General Staff, oriented toward preparing orders, gathering reports, and working out logistical details, and the

Administrative-Economic Staff, oriented toward running the vast zone of communications of the Empire. (12) The revolution in staff orientation led to similar staffs in most armies of the day. It further evolved into the General Staff system designed by the Germans in the late 19th Century and copied by others in the years to come.

Likewise, theoreticians during this time were concerned with staffs and the functions they perform. Clausewitz, although focused on the utilization of forces, consciously excluded preparations for war from his theory. He recognized the need for intelligence and his concept of force utilization included marches, camps, and billets, all requiring staff support. (13) Baron Antoine Jomini, the theorist most important to U.S. military art in the 1800's, believed staffs existed solely to support commanders. In his Summary of the Art of War he devoted several chapters to logistics and fully six of his twelve essential conditions for a perfect army dealt with staff functions. (14) His writings provided a "manual of staff duties till after World War II." (15) This formed a theoretical basis for U.S. staff development. Others, classified as practitioners, dealt with staffs practically, recognizing their importance in command and control. The need for a full-time staff to practice the modern art of war efficiently is supported by the theoretical writings on the subject.

We have seen how "Great Captains" used their staffs in a vital role to aid in mission accomplishment. From Alexander to Napoleon, successful commanders gained an edge on opponents through their staffs. Also, the theory of war emphasizes staff abilities and

importance. As this analysis proceeds, it is helpful to remember the importance staffs play in war. U.S. staff doctrine certainly recognizes this importance.

The evolution of staff principles through history has been logical. Likewise, U.S. staff doctrine has evolved through a logical progression. Three important concepts come to light from this progression: the critical importance of staffs to command and control, the emphasis on functions and procedures, and the advisory role of combat support arms officers on staffs. These concepts have a major impact on today's tactical staffs.

U.S. staff doctrine evolved, not surprisingly, parallel to European doctrine. In 1777, the U.S. staff consisted of a wagon master, commissary of artillery stores, director of medical department, and judge advocate general, all positions patterned after the British. (16) The position of Inspector General (IG) was one exception. The IG provided a responsible staff member to coordinate and conduct training, as well as to handle the inspecting duties we associate with IG's of today. The Prussian Baron von Steuben, the Army's first IG, made a major contribution to the war effort. His performance is often credited as key to the success of the Continental Army. (17) We see then, even in those days, how a key staff member who coordinated, conducted, and inspected unit activities could have a major impact on unit success.

The 1800's contributed little to staff doctrine. Regimental staffs in the War of 1812 had the same organization seen in the War of Independence. This occurred only through coincidence, not due



to doctrine. Civil War staffs existed at the whim of Regimental Commanders. Commanders were free to organize staffs to suit their needs. Some principles such as delegation of authority and specification of staff responsibilities emerged during this time, but no formal adoption of these occurred within the Army. (18)

The Spanish American War brought staff importance to the forefront. Failings in staff actions during this war severely affected U.S. forces' ability to fight. American troops deployed to the tropics with winter uniforms, lived in unsuitable accommodations, routinely ate spoiled rations, and suffered from rampant disease due to shortcomings in staff planning. The military staff at the time "was prepared for peacetime not for war." (19) They certainly did not coordinate logistics (CSS) very well.

The staff disaster of the Spanish American War had an immediate impact. Immediate changes focused on staff organization, not preparedness or training. The Reorganization Act of 1901 set down principles of line and staff procedures. Staff appointments to Military Departments required line officers who rotated every 4 years. This assured a mix of line and staff duties in officers' career development and a balance of experience on the staff. The General Staff Act of 1903 adopted the General Staff concept of the German Army. The only significant difference between the two concepts was that officers would still serve temporarily on the U.S. General Staff, continuing to rotate between line and staff jobs. Still, staff organization at lower levels did not become standard until later based upon the lessons of World War I. (20)

During World War I General John Pershing adopted the functional staff system used by the French. He established the system for the Allied Expeditionary Force (AEF) and this formed the basis for staff organization used by the Army today. (21) After the war, the Harbord Board recommended the same staff organization for division level and below. (22) It became Army doctrine with the publication of Staff Officers' Field Manual (SOFM) 101-5, Part One, Staff Data, in 1932. The basic concepts of staff doctrine outlined in this manual have changed very little since that time.

The focus of the first SOFM 101-5 was on staff principles and organization. It outlined a general staff group consisting of the XO, S1, S2, S3, and S4. In addition, the special staff group included an adjutant, chaplain, surgeon, munitions officer, personnel adjutant, reconnaissance officer, and communications officer. Arrangements were made for an artillery officer, engineer and other advisory officers from attached units on an as-needed basis. (23) This same basic organization exists today. The artillery, engineer, and other combat support arms' representatives are still advisory on battalion staffs. The specific functions of each staff member are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be discussed. More critical to our needs is the mission and five general functions of a staff outlined in the next manual, The Staff and Combat Orders, published in 1940.

The staff specified by doctrine in 1940 was supposed to "assist the commander in his exercise of command." (24) This firmly established the staff as the commander's key means of exercising command and control. At the same time, the manual specified five

functions for the staff to perform. These included the securing of information, the furnishing of information, the preparation of plans, the translation of decisions into orders, and the transmission of orders to the troops. (25) The mission and functions have changed very little in the past 47 years. Basically, the staff today must do the same things. Of interest in the 1940 manual also is its focus on procedures for staff records, reports, SOP's, and combat orders. (26) This orientation toward procedures also set the standard for the future. No mention of staff training or standards for staff duties exists in this manual. Obviously, the manual influenced small unit staff actions in the years to come. Two examples from World War II highlight its impact in the use of combat support arms.

### III. STAFF DISASTERS OF WORLD WAR II

#### A. The Rapido River: 36th Division, 18-22 January 1944

The 36th Infantry Division's attempt to establish a bridgehead across the Rapido River in January 1944 provides a classic example of staff failures. As the culminating effort of Fifth Army's push to clear the Liri valley and linkup with the Anzio landing in Italy, this crossing was key to the Italian Campaign. The division was to cross the Rapido north of the Liri River and clear the high ground vicinity of Sant' Angelo. This would facilitate the crossing of the 34th Division in their sector. The 34th would attack Cassino and open the way for other elements to move through the Liri Valley toward the proposed Anzio

beachhead. (Map 1, Page A1) The attack began on the night of 20 January 1944 and ended in defeat two days later. (27)

The operation failed for many reasons. Some are related to the overall operational effort by Fifth Army. Some say General Mark Clark, Army Commander, sacrificed the 36th Division at the Rapido to assure success at Anzio. Many say the failure of the British 10 Corps to cross the Garigliano River at the scheduled time made the mission unachievable. Some people chastise the division commander for accepting an impossible mission. (28) These concerns, beyond the tactical dimensions of this paper, will not be explored. One fact remains, despite all outside factors, the 36th Division and its subordinate regiments had major command and control problems during the engagement. Most of these were caused by staff failings in planning for and coordinating engineer support. We will concern ourselves with these.

The plan drawn up by the division staff and approved by General Walker, the division commander, called for a night attack by two regiments. A third regiment was in reserve. As early as 4 January the division engineer made arrangements to accomplish the engineer tasks. He developed these tasks through an estimate of the situation. He procured the equipment necessary for the operation, again based upon the estimate. Realizing the operation was difficult, he coordinated for additional units. He secured the 111th Engineer Battalion plus two companies from the 16th Armored Engineer Battalion from Corps to assist. Also, the 19th Engineer Combat Regiment would attach a battalion to each assault infantry regiment. (29)

The engineer estimate had several flaws. It ignored the poor trafficability of all approaches to the river. This prevented vehicle use in the transport of engineer assets. The infantrymen were forced to haul the assets by hand. This problem, overlooked by all staffs above battalion level, adversely affected the operation. Secondly, no thought was given to the command and control problems such a large number of corps engineer units might cause at the lower infantry unit level. This hurt the operation immensely, especially considering the poor teamwork which occurred between the two groups. Third, poor collaboration on the engineer plan between the division engineer and division commander contributed to failure. The resulting synchronization problems of engineer and infantry assets was a major cause of the defeat. (30)

As for other planning, the fire support plan was supportive of the maneuver plan. (31) Massive indirect fires by twelve battalions were planned near each crossing site. One unanticipated problem, the lack of observed fire due to fog, smoke, and artillery observer casualties, could not be prevented. (32) The use of the XII Air Support Command was limited due to other competing missions, but preplanned air strikes hit Sant' Angelo on 20 January. (33)

The maneuver plan was simple from the division perspective. The two assault regiments would attack at night, force crossings using boats and footbridges, secure the far side and defeat enemy resistance in the vicinity of Sant' Angelo. Tanks and tank destroyers of the 36th and 34th Divisions and CCB, 1st Armored Division would be in support. Intelligence showed a dug in enemy in good shape on the far side. As was normal then, and apt to be

the case in the future, enemy dispositions were not perfectly predicted. (34)

The two assault regiments conducted a rehearsal across the Volturno River prior to the actual assault, but it was of marginal value. Little was learned about the challenges to be faced on the Rapido. The Volturno was not representative of the Rapido and engineer-infantry teamwork was lacking. Also, General Walker changed one of the assault regiments at the last minute, thus sending a regiment on the actual assault with no practice. The division staff believed the rehearsal was successful despite its apparent shorings. (35) The division staff had set the stage for the assault on the Rapido River. Little did they know that the marginal engineer estimate, poor rehearsal, and lack of detail in the plan would cause major problems during execution.

The 143d Infantry Regiment, designated to conduct the assault in the South, fought one of the most confusing engagements of the War on the nights of 20 and 21 January. Major command and control problems caused this regiment to fail in its mission. Although other factors impacted upon this failure, staff actions at the regimental and battalion level were key to the disaster. Since this Regiment's example is representative of the problems occurring throughout the division, our analysis will concentrate on the 143d.

On 18 January 1944 the 143d Regiment issued its operation order for the riverline assault. The regiment would cross the river below Sant' Angelo at two sites. The 1st Battalion crossing was some 800 yards north of the 3rd Battalion. The 2d Battalion, in reserve, would reinforce where needed. One company in each

assault battalion would use boats while the other companies would cross on footbridges laid at each site. (36)

The significant failing of the Regiment's plan was in conjunction with the engineers. First, the staff coordinated little support for the engineers. The enemy maintained some control of the near bank and had emplaced mines on the river approaches. Enemy patrols created problems for engineers who marked routes to the crossing sites through the mines. Also, the pre-positioning of materials for the crossing was difficult. In fact, the engineer boating and bridging was positioned two miles from the river. It is tragic the infantry did not plan for or conduct enough security efforts to assist the engineers. They also had no plan for reconnaissance of routes, but relied solely on engineer guides. Finally, procedures for unity of command remained hazy. The infantry disliked taking orders from engineers and would later ignore many of them. (37) To compound these problems, the regimental S3 did not inform the engineer battalion commander of crossing site changes until the afternoon of 19 January. This failure added to the confusion on the night of the attack.

Almost immediately upon commitment on 20 January, poor teamwork between the 143rd and the engineers reigned supreme. Very quickly the regiment suffered from a loss of control. Thick fog caused engineer guides to get lost and lead forces into minefields. Many casualties occurred from uncleared and unmarked enemy mines. The men carrying the boating and bridging materials to the river suffered in the confusion. A host of destroyed and abandoned boats blocked traffic lanes, and some boats were placed in the river

despite holes in them. These went down quickly. Other boats sank because they were improperly launched or incorrectly paddled and some boats in perfectly good condition were deserted because of heavy enemy fire. In addition, frequently misunderstood or ignored oral orders and improper reports between the engineers and infantry added to the confusion. This often resulted in small groups of soldiers acting unilaterally, out of control. Finally, since the troops were concentrated on only two crossing sites, the enemy was able to mass his fires. (38)

All of the aforementioned problems could have been avoided through a more coordinated team effort between the infantry and engineers. The S3 was responsible to "coordinate activities..... with engineer troops" and to "harmonize the plan with other arms and services", according to the 1940 edition of SOFM 101-5. (39) Neither the regimental or battalion S3's accomplished this important function.

After an all-night attempt, only some elements of the 1st Battalion made it across the river. These were pinned down by intense enemy fire. No one from the 3rd Battalion made it across. When smoke pots were needed at first light to mask the movements still required to continue the operation, it was discovered that neither the engineers nor the infantry had arranged for their pickup. Six hundred smoke pots were awaiting pickup at division. By 1000 hours the next morning, neither assault battalion had men left on the far side of the river. Also, a majority of the available boats for the first night's crossing were destroyed. (40) The regiment was ordered to try again.



The attack on 21 January went no better than the night before. First, the confusion of the previous night remained. The engineer battalion commander of the boat status, yet promised more boats. His staff could not provide accurate information. The 1st and 3rd Battalions were still disorganized. Smoke remained on the battlefield. Forward observers could not see through the haze to call indirect fire. The regimental staff did a hasty, incomplete plan for the assault scheduled to begin at 2100 hours that night. Division changed the time to 1400, but the additional boats arrived at 1430 in the regimental area, too late to be of use. The attack was delayed until 2100 by the regimental commander. Division usurped that order and demanded the assault begin as soon as possible "with whatever boats were on hand". (41)

Despite this confusing state of affairs, the 3rd Battalion managed to get all elements across the Rapido by midnight. Immediately pinned down by heavy fire within 500 yards of the river, they needed anti-tank weapons to break out. The 2d Battalion, committed from its reserve position, had half its companies pinned down within 300 yards of the river. Likewise, the 1st Battalion's assault elements at the northern crossing site were pinned down 200 yards from the river. Although forces were now across the river, the situation was hopeless on the far side. To compound the problem, most boats and bridges in the area were destroyed. (42) What the regimental commander needed now was tanks and tank destroyers. This required heavy bridging.

Colonel Martin, the regimental commander ordered Bailey bridges to be built for the heavy equipment to cross the river. He

was briefed earlier to install these in the bridgehead instead of the normal ponton bridges. This decision, made by the Corps G3, was necessary due to lost time from the failures of the previous night. The Division G3 reinforced this necessity. (43)

The engineers supporting the 143rd were shocked to hear of the decision as they were not consulted in the process. Bailey bridges took 6 hours to install and were normally not installed under enemy pressure. Still, Colonel Martin insisted and the engineers tried to comply. One Bailey bridge was begun at 0300 and was 5 percent complete at 0700 hours. It was projected to be complete by 1500 if enemy resistance slackened. Since the trucks hauling bridging equipment forward were stuck in the mud, the mission was doomed to failure. Finally, about 1000 hours, with no hope for a vehicular bridge to facilitate tank support, the regiment withdrew. (44) The assault across the Rapido River had failed amid total confusion. The ill-fated infantry-engineer effort fueled the ineffective command and control leading to the failure.

Two important insights can be gained about staffs from the operations of the 36th Division at the Rapido River. First, staffs have a major impact on the commander's ability to command and control. The division saw the operation as a very simple one; two regiments assaulting the river, a third regiment in reserve, and tanks, tank destroyers and artillery lending support. Engineer support was decentralized down to the regiments. Lack of detail in this overall plan set the stage for confusion.

At the regimental and battalion staff levels, the simple division plan was not converted into a detailed plan. Engineer

planning and coordination was haphazard, resulting in severe problems. Problems with moving engineer equipment to crossing sites and using engineer equipment and boats properly created confusion. The poor plan and execution of breaching and moving through enemy minefields resulted from poor coordination. The failure of the 143rd and its subordinate battalions to provide adequate security to assist the engineers, especially after a late change in crossing sites, set the conditions for failure. This was especially significant for a night operation. Finally, the massing of assets on only two crossing sites in an exposed area allowed the enemy to mass devastating fires. These fires added to the confusion. Subsequently, when the first night's crossing failed, the staffs showed no imagination. They merely modified the same operation despite the disaster of the night before. The problems with Bailey bridging needed for follow-up of the initial assault are indicative of this.

The second major lesson learned from this operation concerns the lack of training of staffs for the employment of combat support arms, especially engineers. Although the unit had fought in Italy for some time, the need for detailed plans for a river crossing certainly was not apparent. Nor was it understood that stood that extensive coordination was necessary for such a difficult operation. Poor coordination between staffs proved fatal. Everything from the failure to pick up smoke pots to the late notification of changes in crossing sites shows poor coordination. The doctrine clearly gave each staff duties in support of commanders, but performance standards for the duties were lacking.

The defeat at the Rapido owes much of its failure to staff actions. Many of these same lessons would be learned again ten months later in the Huertgen Forest.

B. The Huertgen Forest: 28th Division, 2-5 November 1944

The 28th Infantry Division engagement in the Huertgen Forest in November 1944 provides another example of how staff failures impact on unit success. The division, part of V Corps, had the mission to attack and seize the high ground vicinity of Schmidt while maintaining contact with VII Corps to the North. This was the supporting attack for Hodges' First Army main attack into Germany. The division's engagement was conducted as three independent regimental fights and developed into the worst fighting the units encountered during the War. (45) Charles MacDonald in his description of this action says it was "one of the most costly actions to be fought by a U.S. division during World War II". (46)

The key part of the division engagement was the 112th Regiment's actions vicinity of Schmidt. By 3 November the 2nd Battalion of this regiment occupied the open slopes of the Vossenack Ridge. The 3rd Battalion had passed by the 2nd and was occupying the town of Schmidt. The 1st Battalion, behind the 3rd in the town of Kommerscheidt, prepared to back up the 3rd Battalion. The picture looked surprisingly good on the night of 3 November. (47) (Map 2, Page A2)

The occupation of Schmidt by the 3rd battalion is most helpful for our analysis. By focusing upon its operations on 4 November

1944, we obtain a good indication of staff failures and their impact on combat support arms. This battalion fought its way against limited resistance on 3 November into the town of Schmidt. Led by Company K, which closed into the town at 1430 hours, the battalion occupied the town just after nightfall. (48) By 1000 hours the next morning, the battalion would break and run in the face of an enemy counterattack.

Various reasons for the virtual disintegration of the battalion have been proposed. These range from poor leadership and disastrous tactics to the effects of extreme weather conditions and the strong, concentrated German counterattack. (49) Certainly, the collapse was not caused by any single factor, but a combination of many. One important reason for the defeat, the poor planning and coordination of the staff in the use of combat support assets, is the focus of this analysis.

Despite the apparent success of the regiment, major combat support problems put the 3d Battalion in a precarious position on 4 November. First, the Kall River trail, the major route from the division to Schmidt, needed engineer work. This trail was too narrow for tanks and unfit for resupply vehicles to easily negotiate. B Company, 20th Engineer Battalion was to maintain one-way traffic through to the Kall River bridge while Company A did the same from the bridge to Schmidt. C Company, in reserve, could only be committed by the 1171st Engineer Group. Problems with this plan proved decisive at Schmidt.

The battalion decided it was too dangerous to bring vehicles forward. They established a dump two miles to the rear and carried

tools and materials forward by hand. This slowed their operations. Also, security for the engineers was neglected. They secured their own movement and work sites. (50) This depleted their strength. A further problem existed with the command relationship. The engineers were in close support of the 112th Regiment. No direct relationship existed between the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry and the engineers. No engineer representative accompanied the 3d Battalion on its mission and no one on the 3rd Battalion staff had direct engineer responsibilities. This command problem proved disastrous throughout the engagement.

As already mentioned, the condition of the Kall trail was in question. Two engineer officers reconnoitered the route on 3 November and considered it passable for tanks. The first tanks to attempt its traverse could not make it. They reported this to the tank battalion commander. (51) By darkness elements of Company A and B of the engineers arrived to work on the road. Their mission was to clear the road by daylight and they proceeded at a leisurely pace. During the night only three supply weasels from the 3d Battalion crossed the Kall. (52)

Meanwhile, in Schmidt the 3d Battalion prepared to defend. The battalion had no combined arms available for its defense. Antitank support consisted of only 60 mines hastily emplaced on top of the ground. These arrived in the three supply weasels which traversed the Kall that night. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Albert Flood, wanted tanks, tank destroyers, or at least 57-mm antitank guns built into his defenses by daylight. None would cross the Kall that night. The regimental S3 journal for this

night records no request for tank support from the 3d Battalion. Still, several elements from the tank battalion and antitank company tried to traverse the Kall Gorge but found the road blocked. (53) The impact of no tank support at Schmidt, a result of coordination problems with the engineers, would be a major cause for concern at first light in the morning. (54)

The second major combat support problem for the 3d Battalion was with artillery. The division artillery communications officer is quoted as saying "no call for fire failed to be transmitted during the entire Schmidt operation". (55) But, the artillery did not fire until 0850 hours on 4 November, almost two hours after the enemy counterattacked. By the time indirect fires began, the battalion was reeling from its positions. The battalion staff, arriving late in the town and not expecting an enemy attack early the next morning, failed to plan indirect fires adequately. Without anti-tank support and isolated from other units due to the condition of the MSR, indirect fires should have been a top priority, especially since Schmidt was the division main effort. Still, for one reason or another, artillery support did not positively influence the engagement. (56)

The third combat support problem for the 3d Battalion was with friendly air support. On 4 November it was not used until 1230 hours, two and one half-hours after the 3rd Battalion left Schmidt. (57) The division's plan for air support centered on the isolation of the Schmidt objective from reinforcement by tanks. The abominable weather on 2 and 3 November prevented this mission from being accomplished. (58) Still, on 4 November the weather

allowed flying and aircraft were available. Apparently, no one on the staff anticipated the need for direct support. It is interesting that at 1230 hours the 396th Squadron of the 360th Group (P-47's) attacked the town of Schmidt, after the 3d Battalion withdrew. (59) A more timely application of this support, orchestrated through the staff, might have saved the day.

Just as in the Rapido River engagement discussed earlier, this engagement contributes insights about staff planning and execution in the use of combat support arms. The failure of the engineers to realize the importance of clearing the Kall trail for tank and tank destroyer traffic on 3 November relates directly to staff failure. If the regimental and battalion staffs were "assisting the commander with all aspects of his command," they certainly failed to coordinate this key mission successfully. Had the anti-tank units arrived at Schmidt in time to participate in the battle, the result may have been different. After all, five hours later the 2d Battalion, 112th Regiment held off a similar counterattack at Kommerscheidt with tanks as a key to success. (60) Likewise, the poor planning and coordination with both air and indirect fire support at Schmidt resulted in untimely application of these assets. Again, the staff's failure in coordinating combat support arms fueled the defeat. Earlier use of all fires was necessary to influence the outcome.

The staffs involved at Schmidt were ill-trained in the use of combat support arms, despite the doctrinal requirement for this principle. The unit was not new to combat. It deployed to France in July 1944, fought across France and against the Siegfried Line



in earlier engagements. (61) Still, staff coordination was lacking and the standards for staff duties were certainly suspect. Just as the 36th Division suffered defeat at the Rapido due, in part, to staff failures, the 28th Division in the Huertgen Forest suffered the same fate.

The two engagements from World War II have brought several important insights to light. The doctrine before the war set the functions for staffs. The coordination and harmonizing of combat support arms assets was clearly as clearly a staff function. At both the Rapido River and Schmidt, staff failings in this function fueled the defeat of the units involved. Certainly, the lower level staffs were not trained to a proper standard for the employment of combat support arms. This poor training played a large part in commanders losing control. It is significant that in these two engagements, two of the U.S. Army's darkest moments in World War II, staff failures in harmonizing combat support arms directly influenced the defeat of units. Such failings must be avoided in the future. Today's battalion staffs, concerned with synchronizing combat support arms on a larger, more lethal and highly sophisticated battlefield, are challenged even more than the staffs of WW II to avoid these failings.

#### IV. THE BATTALION STAFF AND ITS ABILITIES TODAY: AN ANALYSIS

The preceding analysis has set the stage for a look at today's battalion staff. Staff doctrine clearly emphasized procedures and functions. Battalion staff organization was fixed with combat

support arms officers as advisors on a temporary basis. Staff importance for unit success has been detailed, both through history and in World War II. Clearly, the "Great Captains" gained a measure of success by properly organizing and using staffs. U.S. commanders found staff failures instrumental in the defeats at Rapido and Schmidt. A properly functioning staff appears to be important in command and control, an aspect which takes on new meaning on today's modern battlefield. The question remains, can our battalion staffs meet the combat support arms challenges of this modern battlefield? What key points from our analysis of staff evolution and history are most relevant to staff functioning today? A comparison of the doctrine, organization, and importance of staffs of the past with those of the present should provide the answer to these questions.

The focus of staff doctrinal development was on functions. Key to success was the staff's ability to assist the commander with all aspects of command. Current staff doctrine focuses upon the same functions and responsibilities. A staff in accordance with 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations (May 1984), is to "assist the commander in decision making" and "the military staff is organized specifically to be a single, cohesive unit to assist the commander in accomplishing the mission. The staff is organized to serve the commander within specific functional areas." (62) Clearly, this aspect of staffs has not changed since World War II.

Further analysis of today's doctrine is helpful. Staff functions are to coordinate operations, obtain and provide information, estimate and anticipate the situation, recommend

courses of action, prepare plans and orders, and supervise execution. (63) The commander uses his staff in his own way. His command and control "organization includes the role and relationships of the staff, the authority and responsibilities of the staff, and the functional grouping of staff sections." (64)

The major implication of this focus is that standards for staff performance are set by the commander. Clearly, "the commander alone is responsible for all that his unit does or fails to do." (65) This impetus on the commander's role results in a lack of standardization between battalion staffs. It creates an environment where staff officers accomplish functions according to each commander's desires. Consequently, the burden of how the staff performs in the use of combat support arms is on each battalion commander. This is a barrier to battalion staff training in several ways.

First, "the commander must have a staff that is a professional team." (66) Teamwork is essential on the battalion staff. The longer a staff trains together under the same commander, the better they can perform as a team in accordance with his desires. Obviously then, to be effective, battalion staffs need stability. Most policies today stabilize company and battalion commanders. No such stability for captains on a staff exists. For majors, the critical S3's and XO's on battalion staffs, policies vary. A 12-month assignment in either of these positions is the longest we can expect. Even then, since many majors vie for these jobs, pressure often exists to curtail assignments. A battalion commander in his two years of command can

expect continuous turnover on the staff. This lack of stability makes effective staff training difficult. The doctrinal focus toward teamwork is a good one. Doctrine focuses on the need for on the staff to make up for the lack of standardization between staffs. Our implementation of this doctrine leaves something to be desired.

Second, doctrine puts a premium on training staff officers in functions. This helps officers form a basis for staff assignments. Also, experience as a line officer, something recognized early in the evolution of doctrine and reinforced by the Staff Reorganization Act of 1901, complements this functional training emphasis. (67) The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), a training ground for captains in the functions required for quality staff work, was founded on this principle. (68) Officers starting with a firm basis in staff functions are more easily fit into a commander's staff team. This mitigates the lack of standardization mentioned earlier. Consequently, former company commanders and CAS3 graduates should make up battalion staffs. How often can this be accomplished?

Finally, the burden of combat support arms employment falls on commanders. The use of artillery, engineers, air defense assets, and all other combat support arms is a severe challenge to most staffs. Undoubtedly, a trained staff officer is well-grounded in functions and procedures, but is not required to be an expert in combat support arms employment. Consequently, the burden of training the staff in supporting arms use falls directly on the shoulders of the battalion commander. Staff doctrine sets the

stage for this requirement by virtue of its procedural and functional orientation.

The end result of the continuing emphasis in staff doctrine toward functions is important when assessing staff abilities. Although flexibility is gained by allowing commanders great freedom in staff performance, barriers also derive from this principle. Standardization between battalion staffs does not exist. The lack of standardization to bind all battalion staffs together puts a premium on experienced staff officers. Finally, a great burden is placed on battalion commanders to train staffs in the use of combat support arms. They get insufficient training elsewhere in this vital role. Today's battalion staffs reflect these problems.

Our analysis of doctrine must include another critical area. As we have seen, the combat support arms have always provided a staff officer on an as-needed basis to battalion staffs. These "advisors" to the commander assisted with the employment of their particular arm. The 36th and 28th Divisions suffered from this organizational problem in World War II. Today's staff doctrinal organization retains this principle and is still of concern.

As outlined in current FM 101-5, "commanders of attached or supporting units provide staff assistance, as required, in their areas of interest." (69) At the battalion level this means the engineer platoon leader attached or in direct support of the unit becomes the staff advisor on engineer matters. He also leads his platoon in executing missions. The same relationship exists for most other supporting arms. Also, as FM 101-5 outlines, "the commander (or his designee) of an attached or supporting FA unit

normally serves as the fire support coordinator if organic FA is not present." (70) This means the fire support officer at battalion level is normally a designee and his job is temporary in nature. No set doctrine establishes permanence to his position. This organization hinders battalions in the planning for and employment of combat support arms.

To overcome the hindrance mentioned above, battalion staffs must train especially hard on the employment of combat support arms. Infantry officers on an infantry battalion staff are more proficient in infantry employment than in other arms. Their experience lies there. Since combat support arms officers are temporary on staffs, the proper integration of these arms is more of a challenge. History bears this out. Also, NTC results show weaknesses on maneuver staffs in planning for and synchronizing combat support arms, especially artillery, engineers, air defense, attack helicopters and Air Force assets. (71) The mere fact that the NTC operating systems include fire support, air defense, mobility/countermobility/survivability, and command and control supports this proposition. (72) Certainly, the emphasis resulting from NTC insights concerning combat support arms is encouraging. Still, the employment of combat support arms remains a challenge. Considering past problems with this important aspect of fighting, it seems the placing of combat support arms officers organic to maneuver battalions is warranted. A full wartime staff at battalion level, available to practice the art of harmonizing combat support and combat arms, would enhance preparedness for war.

The importance of a staff to unit success is the final implication worth mentioning. In the past, this importance was clearly recognized. All "Great Captains" used their staffs to gain an edge on their enemy. Today this edge can best be gained through the use of combined arms. Even the evolution of U.S. staff doctrine centered on the need for an effective staff to assist commanders in exercising command. The examples from World War II discussed earlier showed the inability of staffs to do this. A staff can enhance the chances for success of a unit, even though proper staff actions do not necessarily ensure success. These same ramifications remain today.

With the modern battlefield more challenging at lower levels than in the past, today's "Captains" must gain an edge through the use of their staffs. "It is widely recognized that modern warfare will be conducted in dynamic and unpredictable environments never before experienced." (73) To confront all the challenges of modern warfare, commanders need a highly trained, imaginative staff, fully versed in the employment of combined arms. (74)

As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the National Training Center enhances our awareness of staff importance. A common saying coined by the NTC, one that has become a watchword in the Army, is "the battalion can lose the battle, but not win it." (75) Just as the staffs of the 28th and 36th Divisions at the Rapido River and Schmidt did much to lose engagements, battalion staffs today can do the same. All told, today's staffs are more important to battalion commanders than ever before. Recognizing this importance and doing something about it is a critical factor

in the synchronization of combined arms. This ability is critical to unit success on the battlefield today, and in the future. But have we really recognized this importance and are we doing what is necessary to ensure staffs do not lose engagements at battalion level before subordinates can win them?

The recognition by today's battalion "Captains" of the critical importance of staffs is suspect. As outlined earlier, senior leaders in the Army are concerned about staff proficiency. Still, battalion commanders today do not completely recognize staffs as critical to success. Of twenty-two articles written by former battalion commanders in guides for future commanders, only nine discussed the importance of the staff. Of these, most mentioned the staff as a means of overcoming peacetime distractors instead of as the key to winning engagements in the next war. (76) This perspective on staffs, proliferated by misguided peacetime requirements, needs modification.

Training emphasis is also important in the recognition of staffs. Recent articles in Military Review and other publications indicate renewed concern toward staff training. As one author put it, it takes a battalion staff two or three days to adjust to being in the field. Often, poor proficiency in staff operations creates a situation where the battalion soldiers and units become training aids so the staff can learn its trade. (77) Other authors try to convince readers of the importance of training a staff. Much doubt exists as to the amount of training necessary to train a staff to an acceptable level of proficiency. (78) The only clear point is "there is a tendency to let garrison activities prevail and to



defer this type training to times when the unit is in the field." (79) This allows insufficient time to properly train, especially since peacetime, garrison activities often have little similarity to wartime tasks. Considering these controversies on training, the recognition of staff importance to success is not fully developed. After all, recognizing staff importance and doing something about it are two very different ideas, especially when valuable training time is concerned.

A final concern about the recognition of staff importance by today's "Captains" is that combat support arms "advisors" don't train enough with organic maneuver unit staffs. As already addressed in this paper, teamwork is critical to staff proficiency. Combat support arms officers from attached and DS units must be incorporated into team training. Too often this does not occur, especially in garrison. Just as the maneuver units at the Rapido River and Schmidt work and faulty coordination with combat support arms units, today's staffs will face similar problems. More pressure is needed to bring "advisory" staff officers to more training, especially in garrison.

The combination of the aforementioned factors concerning today's "Captains" indicates an unacceptable level of recognition of staff importance. Until the battalion "Captains" have this realization, problems in planning for and using combat support arms will continue. Challenges in this area are too complex to ignore.

Current doctrine also indicates an unacceptable recognition level of staff importance on the modern battlefield. I have already mentioned the emphasis on functions in doctrine and the

barriers this creates to proper staff training. Also, the organizational problems with with staffs have been discussed. Perhaps it is time for a change in both these principles. A stability policy for staff officers would help develop the teamwork necessary for staff proficiency. Also, I wonder if we are really serious about staff performance while we allow battalion staffs to train without full-time experts on artillery planning and employment, engineer doctrine, air defense principles, attack helicopter capabilities, and Air Force command and control. Results from past engagements and NTC results graphically show how this shortage of expertise adversely affects units and often leads to defeat.

Doctrine needs to evolve toward better combat support arms employment at lower levels. Our current doctrinal staff manual, FM 101-5, devotes a full 200 of its 250 pages toward procedures and formats just as its predecessor in 1940 devoted much of its content to the same subjects. Combat support arms planning and employment is largely ignored in its pages.(80) Likewise, the CAS3 Program of Instruction concentrates on generic staff skills and largely ignores the importance of combined arms. Of the 479.5 hours of instruction, only thirty-six are devoted to combined arms operations and those are done in the non-resident portion of the course.(81) It is debatable whether current staff doctrine really recognizes battalion staff importance in the employment of combat support arms.

Despite the debatable nature of our recognition of staff importance, some indicators show promise. The National Training

Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, and the Hohenfels Training Center are all valuable for staff training. No doubt, the "focused" NTC rotation devoted to the battalion staff mentioned earlier will have an impact. The advent of ARTBASS and various other staff training simulations certainly indicates a renewed emphasis toward maximizing training time for staffs. (82) The major emphasis in doctrine toward command and control also bodes well for staff training. All these indicators positively impact on future commanders to help elevate battalion staffs to their proper place in winning the next war.

#### V. CONCLUSIONS

The importance of battalion staffs' abilities to plan and execute combined arms operations in the next war cannot be ignored. The realization of this fact is progressing in the Army. The recent emphasis on command and control, the advent of battalion task force training centers which focus upon staff abilities to use combined arms, and the existence of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School all indicate renewed emphasis. Still, the task is not complete. As we have seen, many indicators still exist to show an incomplete realization of staff importance. The foregoing analysis points out many of these indicators. Full realization is essential before implementation of change can occur.

Based upon this analysis, only one conclusion is possible. The average battalion task force staff in today's Army cannot meet the combined arms challenges of the modern battlefield. Too many

barriers to effective combat support arms employment still remain. Current staff doctrine and staff organization at battalion level are the greatest barriers.

Doctrine continues to emphasize staff functions to the exclusion of staff standards. Although flexibility is often enhanced through this emphasis, lack of standardization between staffs remains. This is a major barrier to the preparedness of staffs for war. Poor teamwork and variable performance standards result from lack of standardization. These pitfalls can be overcome by stabilizing primary staff officers, slotting experienced personnel (former company commanders and CASS graduates) in primary staff positions, and emphasizing combined arms fundamentals in training. Steps to initiate all or some of these positive steps at Army level are worth looking into. Lieutenant General Saint, Commander, III Corps, has taken a giant step toward overcoming these pitfalls with his recent Staff Training Proficiency Evaluation. He has specified absolute criteria for staff standards, required qualifications for different staff positions, and an evaluation to ensure these baseline standards are met. (83) An Army-wide program, patterned after the III Corps' example, would be a step in the right direction toward better wartime proficiency of staffs.

The second major barrier to staff proficiency in the use of combat support arms is in organization. Since the first publication of a staff manual, combat support arms officers have been temporary on battalion staffs. Today AirLand Battle doctrine is explicit in the requirement for maneuver units to fight with

engineer, artillery, air (both fixed and rotary wing), and air defense units all integrated on the modern battlefield. How is it that we have a Signal Corps, Military Intelligence and Chemical Corps officer organic to battalion staffs, but no artilleryman, engineer, air defender, or air representative. As historical examples and recent NTC results indicate, the integration of these assets certainly has as much, if not more, impact on unit success as intelligence, communications, or chemicals. Training the staff for integration of these assets cannot be complete with our current organization. An adjustment is necessary to make up for the expansion of the battlefield.

Battalion staffs today confront challenges characterized by greater space and timing concerns, greater lethality, and corresponding increases in command and control problems. As a somewhat frustrated battalion commander was heard to remark after a particularly biting after action review at the NTC, "the staff exists to make my job easier, not harder. It should not be a burden which I must continually keep from screwing up the battalion's operations." (84) Unfortunately, the barriers of doctrine, the faults in organization, and the often too late recognition by commanders of staff importance in warfighting make this statement commonplace. The inability of battalion staffs to integrate all combined arms on the battlefield properly makes commanders' jobs more difficult, not easier.

## VI. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Recommending changes based upon a study such as this requires great care. Certainly, making sweeping changes on the strength of a brief analysis is rife with danger and subject to many pitfalls. The fact remains, we always face tough choices when constrained by scarce resources and limited training time. The following three achievable recommendations, the result of this analysis, fall into the category of those tough choices decision-makers must face.

The first recommendation, and undoubtedly most controversial, deals with maneuver battalion staff organization. The Army must reorganize battalion staffs to include at least an artillery, engineer, and Air Force officer as organic, full-time members. The conclusions from our analysis support the need for this reorganization. Since the current system doubtless has strengths which this study has not investigated, more study is needed to properly address this topic. Still, we cannot ignore the continued inability of battalion staffs to properly employ combined arms. The organization of maneuver battalion staffs certainly warrants further intensive study to correct this important shortcoming.

Second, doctrine must continue to move toward recognizing the complexity of modern battle, especially in the integration of combat support arms. We know today's doctrine creates barriers to our ability to field proficient battalion staffs. We also know we can overcome these barriers. Specifically, we need to stabilize officers at battalion level for longer periods of time, we must require experienced officers (former company commanders and CASB

graduates) for primary staff positions, and we must include more combined arms fundamentals in junior officer professional development schools, especially CAS3. These changes will help overcome the barriers prevalent in today's staff doctrine.

Finally, the recognition that today's battlefield (and the one in the future) requires better trained staffs at lower levels than ever before is a first step in the right direction. In many ways this message is getting across to future leaders in the Army. Still, more work is needed before this recognition is fully developed. Continued emphasis on this important subject, through military writings, command awareness and implementation of the changes mentioned above, is critical if we are serious at winning engagements.


Today's battalions perform the missions of past brigades and divisions on a battlefield much expanded and more lethal and fluid than any we have ever seen. It is time we realized battalion staffs can lose engagements before subordinates can win them. We can meet the combined arms challenges of the modern battlefield. The changes outlined above will ensure the conditions for success are set by battalion staffs, so that fighting soldiers can achieve victory.

APPENDIX A


	Page
Map 1 (143d Regiment at the Rapido River).....	A1
Map 2 (112th Regiment at Schmidt).....	A2



# MAP 1



MAP 2



## ENDNOTES

1 U.S. Army, "ISP 13 Printout, Subject: Bde and Bn Staffs." Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 11 September 1987. This printout capsulizes all input from the field concerning lessons learned at NTC and from other field problems. It is available from CALL upon request and can be generated in various versions depending on the desired scope.

2 Interview with Captain Joseph Bukartek, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 5 September 1987. The "focused" rotation at NTC is quickly becoming a means for various agencies in the Army to gather insights on particular subjects. The Infantry School has proponentcy for this particular rotation. The fact that this rotation is "focusing" upon the battalion staff indicates the perceived need for further study.

3 John Shy, "First Battles in Retrospect," in America's First Battles 1776-1965, ed. Charles E Heller and William A. Stott. (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1981), p. 330.

4 Huba Wass de Czege, "Challenge for the Future: Educating Field Grade Battle Leaders and Staff Officers," Military Review, June 1984, p. 3-13.

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6 Ibid., p. 21.

7 Lecture by General Carl E. Vuono, SAMS, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 5 October 1987.

8 U.S. Army, "Staff Evaluation," Letter signed by LTG Crosbie E. Saint, HQ's III Corps and Ft Hood, Fort Hood, Texas, 11 May 1987.

9 U.S. Army, "Staff Evaluation Letter of Instruction," Letter, For the Commander: LTG Crosbie E. Saint, HQ's III Corps and Ft Hood, Fort Hood, Texas, 14 May 1987. This LOI explicitly defines the standards, position requirements, and evaluation criteria for staffs within III Corps. It includes battalion staffs and recognizes experience, CAS3, and stability as requirements for staffs to be evaluated as proficient.

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17 Ibid., p. 10.

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20 Ibid., p. 11-15.

21 Hittle, p. 211.

22 Speer, p. 16.

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26 Ibid., Ch 1-2.

27 Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 322-326.

28 Ibid., p. 350-351.

29 Ibid., p. 328-329.

30 Ibid., p. 325.

31 Ibid., p. 323.

32 Ibid., p. 336.

33 Ibid., p. 332.

- 34 Ibid., p. 322-324.
- 35 Ibid., p. 329-330.
- 36 Ibid., p. 331.
- 37 Ibid., p. 334.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 SOFM 101-5, Part One: Staff Data, p. 13.
- 40 Blumenson, p. 337.
- 41 Ibid., p. 341.
- 42 Ibid., p. 343.
- 43 Ibid., p. 342.
- 44 Ibid., p. 344.
- 45 Thomas M. McGinnis, Major, "Unit Collapse: A Historical Analysis of Two Divisional Battles in 1919 and 1944," (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: MMAS Thesis, 1987), p. 67.
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